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Motion of Petr for 
Appointment of Counsel 
FACTS: On October 17 , 1977, the Court granted cert to the 
Arizona SC on the questions whether the state's "murder scene exception" 
~rrant requirement satisfies the Fourth Amendment and whether a 
statement was admissible for impeachment purposes . The Court also 
granted petr's motion to proceed ifp . 
CONTENTIONS : Petr seeks to have Richard Oseran appointed as counseL' 
Mr . Oseran is familiar with the case, have represented petr at trial and 
on appeal . He has been an attorney for 7 years, and intends to apply 
for admission to the bar of this Court as soon as he receives an appli- 1 
cation form from the Clerk . 
DISCUSSION: Mr. Oseran appears qualified to competently represent 
petr . 
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Ce r t to Ariz . S • C t . P'>A- P"k t-....._. 
(Gordon for the Court) ~~ 
~~
~ 41£-~k44e~Oa .J. ~ 
~--4.-"(S' w-/~~ 
State/Cr f'mi. ~-~·i-- • Tim-e~y 
1. SUMMARY: The issues presented involve the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments. The former involves the validity of 
Arizona's "murder scene exception" to the warrant requirement of 
the Fourth Amendment. The latter involves the voluntariness of a 
__.. ---
statement which was inadmissible in the prosecution's 
case-in-chief under Miranda but was admitted as a prior 
inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes. 
2. 
2. FACTS: Petr's convictions grew out of a narcotics 
"bust" and ensuing shoot-out in Tucson, Arizona. On October 28, 
1974, undercover agent Heqdricks went to petr's apartment, 
ostensibly to buy drugs from petr. After a deal had been 
arranged, Headricks and one other agent left the apartment to 
round up several other agents. Headricks and one other agent 
returned to the apartment, supposedly to pay for the drugs; they 
were backed up by eight other agents. When Headricks knocked on 
the door and announced that they were police, a man in the 
apartment (not petr) tried to slam the door shut. At that point, 
their 
some of the police forced/way into the apartment. Tumult ensued, 
and shots were fired in the bedroom. It turned out that the 
shooting had been between petr and Headricks; both men emptied 
their guns. Headricks and petr were taken to the hospital; 
Headricks later died. Several guns were found in the bedroom. 
For the next four days, a police investigative team 
)
which had been called by the narcotics agents searched and 
inventoried petr's apartment. No one obtained a search warrant, 
and no reason was given for not seeking one. Although no one is 
sure, the officers apparently learned of Headricks' death after 
the search began. 
While in the hospital's intensive care unit, petr was 
questioned by Officer Hunt. 
0 
Petr had just come back frm an 
A 
operation; he was being fed intravenously; he had a tube down his 
throat to help him breathe, another tube through his nose into 
his stomach to keep him from vomiting, and a catheter to his 
(y 
3. 
bladder. The testimony was unclear as to the extent of his 
medication. Petr insists that he was drugged (which is quite 
plausible considering the other indicators of his condition), but 
a nurse testified that petr had not received medication and was 
alert. Petr could not talk and answered by writing notes. 
The interrogation began with questions about another 
wounded suspect. Then petr was told that he was charged with 





times (petr says 7), petr told the officer. that he did 
questions 
to answer any more / and wanted to consult with a --
The officer nevertheless continued the interrogation, 
stopping only when petr fell asleep or lapsed into 
unconsciousness. 
Petr was charged with and convicted of first degree 
murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and unlawful possession of, . 
sale of, and possession with intent to sell, narcotics. The s. 
Ct. of Arizona reversed the murder and assault convictions for 
reasons not here relevant. It rejected petr's Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment contentions, which are the same as those presented in 
this petn. 
On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court held that there 
were no exigent circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a 
warrant. It held that the search was lawful, however, because it 
came within the "murder scene exception" to the warrant 
requirement, under which "the search of a murder scene under 
certain circumstances [is] a valid exception to the 
constitutional warrant requirement." Petn App. 22. Those 
circumstances were further delineated by the court as follows: 
"We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of 
the scene of a homicide--or of a serious 
personal injury with likelihood of death where 
there is reason to suspect foul play--does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment . . . w.here the 
law enforcement officers were legally on the 
premises in the first instance .... For the 
search to be reasonable, the purpose must be 
limited to determining the circumstances of 
death and the scope must not exceed that 
purpose. The search must also begin within a 
reasonable period following the time when the 
officials first learn of the murder (or 
potential murder)." 
4. 
L9. 23. The court cited .its prior decisons in State v. Duke, 110 
Ariz. 320, 518 P.2d 570 (1974); State ex rel. Berger v. Super. 
Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 517 P.2d 1277 (1974); and State v. Sample, 
1 0 7 Ar i z • 4 0 7 , 4 8 9 P • 2 d 4 4 ( 19 71) . (CA 9 disagreed with the 
Arizona position when the Sample case came to it on habeas. 
Sample v. Eyeman, 469 F.2d 819 (CA 9 1972) ~ The court also cited 
several cases in other states which recognize the murder scene 
exception. See Petn App. 22 n. 4. 
As for petr's Fifth Amendment claim, the court held that 
1 
though petr 's statements clearly were obtained in violation of 
Miranda, and therefore could not be admitted as substantive 
evidence, they passed the voluntariness test o= Oregon v. Hass, --- -420 U.S. 714, and Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, and therefore 
could be used to impeach petr's credibility. The court noted 
that the fact that petr could write legibly and "fairly 
sensibl[y]" supported a finding of voluntariness. The S. Ct. was 
not swayed by the fact that the trial court had failed to make 
( · 
5. 
findings on the voluntariness of the confession; it reasoned that 
since the rule is that confessions are inadmissible even for 
impeachment unless they are voluntary, the fact that the trial 
court admitted the statements indicated that it had found them 
voluntary. 
3. CONTENTIONS: (a) Petr challenges the murder scene 
unacceptable, 
exception a~given the principle that exceptions to the warrant 
be 
requirement must/"'jealously and carefully drawn,' and there must 
be 'a showing by those who seek exemption .•• that the 
exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.'" 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (quoting Jones v. 
United States, 357 u.s. 493, 499; McDonald v. United States, 335 
U.S. 451, 456). See also Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 
218, 219. He notes especially the absence of any justification 
~ for not obtaining a warrant here, and the extended and intrusive 
nature of the search. He also notes the explicit conflict 
between Arizona's position and that of the Ninth Circuit. 
{b) • Petr contends that his statements from his 
hospital bed were not in fact inconsistent with his testimony at 
trial, and therefore were not admissible for impeachment t 
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171; and that even if they were 
inconsistent, they were not voluntary. 
4. DISCUSSION: I believe that both of petr's 
contentions have merit. The murder scene exception is novel, and 
the Arizona court has not given much justification for it. The 
state does not attempt to justify the exception on its merits; 
( 6. 
rather, it turns novelty into a reason against granting cert by 
urging the Court to wait until the doctrine has undergone further 
development and refinement in the state courts. (The state notes 
that each time the Arizona S. Ct. has discussed the exception, it 
has given it a narrower interpretation.) But the Ninth Circuit 
already has disapproved the exception, in the very first Arizona 
case to apply it: and the Arizona S. Ct. cites six states that 
I have adopted the exception (Alaska, California, Delaware, Maine, Vermont, and Wyoming) and one that has not (Colorado). Petn App. 
22 n. 4. This seems enough development to permit review. 
( 
The Arizona court almost surely was wrong in its 
application of the voluntariness standard. Petr's condition was 
so bad as to render him particularly inc~pable of resisting 
pressure; if that were not enough, his repeated reques~ to have 
the interrogation cease and to confer with a lawyer indicate 
that he did not speak voluntarily. Furthermore, I tend to agree 
with petr that his statements were not really inconsistent with 
his testimony at trial. (The statements are set out in the 
response at 22-25.) 
The state's response is unpersuasive. It contends that 
the search was lawful because petr could not legitimately claim 
an expectation of privacy in an apartment that had just been the 
scene of a gun battle with the police: that application of a ~£ 
se unreasonableness rule (because ~f the ab{ sence of a warrant) 
would produce the anomalous result of invalidating a "patently 
reasonable [search] under all the circumstances": and, as noted 
7. 
( above, that because of "the limited experience of the courts in 
this unique area [the murder scene exception], it would be 
premature for the Court to intervene at this time." Response at 
4-5. On the Miranda point, the state responds that the degree of 
inconsistency goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of the 
prior statements; that the lucidity of petr's written responses 
indicates voluntariness and trustworthiness; that the 
interrogating officer testified that petr never lapsed into 
unconsciousness; and that "other than the mention of a lawyer on 
several occasions", petr did not indicate that he wanted the 
questioning to cease. 
~ 
There is a rsponse. 
~ 
10/6/77 Bregstein Ops in petn. 
( con+ ' d fnm bae-k.) 
Yf!Vil'~ ft obf~J Pv IJ)~) I btd 
~ ?hovld be .£811si Jent/ ...._ jive, 1;e,., ry 
c.onsitlu~ . ~ lh, Crwd drx~5 nof IJ.)a11f -h 
f~ke. f~ ca<U..- heG~ ~ vi.-:, so u-IYen,e. ( i11 
vJM-1-, ca..u. J wwJ.rJ.. UAf- somm ~ reversal) J 
l ~ cvJ:.,. shl>vld be .Jr~d-
/'J. 
~ ,r 
Pet h&{p5 1 am 1Do new /b ~ b~ 1/ni. 
sf·.JI naiVe. J bvi '/Ae, i"fur~J~ 1t,d ~ 
rJ~u.. wkJ.,.., fdA_ WlM 1n 1f..L inte.nsive cttru-
~ ~ ~WU. :Aocks__ '!J C,OI/Sti t;-n LL . :[ fAink. tfv_ 
~ · bnd•1 1 Vlli """1~ uW.d be a.vf.IIA.tp{_ ,, 
u.. f' L . ML w:}-aujJ: A~M.c,A ~fi on cltdd . be. 
~~· Jn aJ1 ft._e_ 7faJ1 CMM r4L i, ~~ ?Ke 
or-::---hSow, 1f..io Uuvt ~ti.- evvt . ~ td .~t.ad 
k D~ Ar-izon~ c~ arnPL :/4. !¥~ caa..e.. 
( ~ h~vt no! VUQ tL ~ o~ ) J fk ir.Ve5I-:J ~ 
WtvJ ~ a,.,~ W C&J vt--h k ~ r)_, h a.- ,L;,u_ 
r•li rL ~ wh• hew t4vd.- rn-h !£.._ //Cl-7\.L f /I.e_ 
~. Ev~ v.j fl..vu_ IS -fo 6e ~ '' /7\U-t ~ 
~U/r\.J__ 1./Ac er+; 011 II -/b ~ WM/1. ~ vv..~~ I i 
lnJ1 fAp.j t,(L wtVlcL rer m if 4 1- M:t -l!j 
AJ.O.At~ ~ OVn inves·hg~ fetJ.,rn o~ ~~Vn /t..e. tohl.t, 
LUhb 11/VU.. rn 1/v_ 4Unu_. M/._~ 1 . J!.ere fiN.. tM...JVmenl; 
lh OtU!tl 1 ,dtJJ. tV-n, f!/i.Ctffi on {f.J·, ~e !ol/ce do nof . _ 
KnoW f./tll(;f'1 whAJ ~ l'e. j,()J<,;..J jn- . Whtr, ~~ .IVU.. ~'71 _n 
Solve (}., mJM.dvt. , 4JO rf wtr.J.c,L be in, foss, ble -h srdio.Jrt %e. 
( cotr/' d on b4"k Q 1 f . ') 
... 
Voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
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.1 • 
I write to invite your attention to the br ef for 





briefs in this 
weekend, I note that the · appendix incJ uded :d n the state •.: s 
br f ef does not comply in any respect with our Rules. , 
Indeed, much of it is ,i .llegibile. · 
l '~ I· . "' ,.,, ",1. ·)'i' ~ 
~ ' 
The brief aJso is an example of t he need for some 
limitation on the length of the briefs. In this 
uncomplicated case ; the brief is 121 pages long exclusive 
of the appendix. , It includes; ad nauseaum, excerpts .from 
the tes~ i.mony. · " 
tl;. am sending a copy of th i s letter: to members of 
the Court for their information : I believe, however, that 
you have authority' .. to reject briefs .that fai 1 to comply 
with the Rules. As this case is set for argument on 
Febr-uary 21, •~; I suppose it is too J ate to reject the brief 
.without more. , . '· . · 
•' f. '~·· ~~ ~:·" • 
'''&:~~· 
. . Subject to the approval of the Ch i ef Justice (or 
the vi.e'ws of other members of the Court) , I suggest that 
you advise the Attorney General of Arizona that his brief 
will be rejected unless he submits, by some date you 
the appendix in a .. form compatible w.i th our Rules. 
w ~ ~ 
; 




BOB-TAIL BENCH MEMO 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Nancy Feb. 13, 1978 
RE: No. 77-5353, Mincey v. Arizona 
I believe the So Ct. of Arizona should be reversed on 
both questions presented. 
I o The Search 
The search of petr's apartment took place in four - -stages, as described by the State. We are concerned primarily 
• 
with the f~geso The~ lasted from lasted from 
about 3:30 p.m. on the day of the shoot-out until the early ~~~ 
morning if hours of the next day. During this phases the rr- -. 
police went through every nook and cranny of the ~partment, 
and seized a syringe from the bedroom; identification found 
in petr's wallet, which was found inside a pocket of a jacket 
in the bedroom (and where the jacket was found is not stated); 
14 papers containing heroin, which were found in the same 
jacket pocket; and some more heroin paraphernalia from the 
same pocket and from the bathroom (exact location unspecified). 
The~nd ~ of the search lasted for aRK another three 
days or so, when the police found various lead fragments. 
Resp seeks to justify the warrantless search on the 
basis of Arizona's "murder scene" exception to the warrant 
requirement. Arizona's exception is far broader than any of ---... 
the so-called exceptions in other states on which the Arizona 
S. Ct. relied. See App o 111 n. 4. I have read all the other 
states' cases, and although some of them are not completely 
explicit about it, they rely basically on the exception to 
t( ,\ 
the warrant requirement when there ar~ exigent circumstances. ~ 
They do speak of the importance of solving a murder because 
societal 
of the great/interest in apprehending murderers and protecting 
victims, but this usually has been in the context of justifying 
an entry onto the premises and a hurried search through 
them o In several of the cases the evidence seized was in plain 
view. But mostly, the decisions talk about the need for 
\
immediate ppR police action and the consequent inability to 
get a warrant. In some of these cases, it may be that the 
circumstances really were not exigent, but at least the theory 
I 
of these cases has been within the confines of an established 
to 
exception/the warrant requirement. 
Arizona, on the other hand, has been explicit in saying 
that the murder scene exception is a distinct exception. In 
this case the Arizona s. Ct. was explicit in saying that the 
search was not incident to an arrest (because petr already was 
in custody) and that the circumstances exigent. (This ____ ...._ __ _ 
was apparent from the fact that almost everyone in the 
apartment had been injured, and the police had the apartment 
sealed off immediately after the shooting.) This was consistent 
with the court's earlier opinion in State v. Sample, 489 P.2d 
44, 46-47 (Ariz o 1971), where the court justified a warrantless 
search of a mobile home by an officer who returned to the 
scene of the crime after arresting the suspect: 
"This was not a __ . search incident to a 
lawful arrest, as the defendant was already under 
arrest and in custody. • • o Nor is it supported 
by 'exigent' circumstances or the necessity of 
preserving destructible evidence o • . o The evidence 
is also clear that a magistrate was available and 
that [the officer] could have easily obtained a 
search warrant before returning to the mobile home." 
Why a special exception to the warrant requirement is 
necessary under such circumstances is beyond me o Indeed, the 
CA 9 held the search in Sample unconstitutional when the 
issue was raised in a habeas corpus proceeding. Sample v. 
Eyman, 469 F o2d 819 (CA9 1972) (Ely, Renfrew [dj]; Jertberg, 
dissenting). (The dissenting judge did not state any reasons 
but simply said he agreed with the Arizona s. Ct.'s resolution 
of the issues.) 
I 
In short, the "murder scene" exception in most states 
re~lly is a variant or aspect of the exigency exception o 
When exigent circumstances do not exist, there are no legitimate 
reasons for carving out an exception to the warrant requirement o 
In one of the state cases it was suggested that the police 
could not present to the magistrate a specific description of 
what they were looking for, and that they-. could not establish 
probable cause for the search. The court's words are worth 
quoting: 
"As to obtaining a warrant to search and seize, no 
officer couMhave supplied the requisite factual 
affidavit ••• • Although the officers reasonably 
entertained a lively suspicion or 'hunch' that death 
had been caused by an assailant, they could not 
recite facts which would support a finding of probable 
cause to believe a crime had been committed. Moreover, 
it was impossible to describe with any specificity 
whatever the weapon to be searched for or to assert 
that there was any reason to believe that such 
unidentifiable weapon could be found upon the premises." 
State v. Chapman, 250 A. 2d 203, 211 (Me. 1969). As for the 
probable cause point, I find it hard to believe that a 
magistrate would conclude that there was an absence of it 
when the police reported they'd found a body and the cause 
of death was unexplained . (In Chapman the victim had been 
struck with a blunt object, and the husband of the victim told 
the police some confused and inconsistent stories.) As for 
specificity, I think a magistrate would accept it if the police 
said they were searching for the object(s) that caused or 
contributed to the victim's death, or explained the daath. 
If necessary, it would be better to relax the needed specificity 
when dealing with an apparent murder as to which there were 
----------------------------------------no clues than to dispense entirely with the warrant requirement. 
It might be argued that if magistrates regularly will be 
likely to grant warrants when a murder is involved, there is 
no point in going through the formalities; but the warrant 
requirement was conveived of as a necessary formality, to 
interpose the detatched magistrate between the police and the 
citizens . 
II. The Statements 
I do not think petr's statements from the hospital 
bed can be said to have been voluntary. Their reliability 
was substantially diminished by petr's obviously helpless 
and confused condition. It is quite unsettling to read 
the account of the questioning. 
It also seems to me that petr's two statements 
arguably were not inconsistent with his trial testimony, 
but I do not think the Court needs to address or rely on 
this point. If petr had been in normal condition and made 
the statements voluntarily, the 
degree of inconsistency would affect the 
weight, not the admissibility, of the statements. 
N.B. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON , D . C . 20543 
February 16, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO MR.. JUSTICE POWELL 
RE: Mincey v. Arizona, No. 77-5353 
In reply to your communication of February 6, 
1978, concerning the above-captioned case, I too was 
not pleased when I received the brief for the respondent. 
However, upon a close examination of the brief, I found 
that much of the appendix thereto, which was not properly 
printed under Rule 39, was superfluous. 
Most of the material reproduced in the appendix 
to the brief is legibly printed either in the body of the 
respondent's brief itself, properly printed as part of the 
appendix record, or as part of the appendix to the brief 
of petitioner. I realize that it is not up to you or the 
other Justices to figure out which is irrelevant or which 
is part of some other printed brief or record filed in the 
case. 
I spoke to William J. Schafer, III, Chief Counsel 
in the Criminal Division, and called the matter to his 
attention. He agreed that the brief was poorly printed 
but that he was out of the city at that time conducting a 
trial. He did not see the brief until he returned to his 
office. Mr. Schafer advised me that he would take such 
corrective measures as the Court may suggest or direct. 
This being an in forma pauperis case, both the 
brief of the petitioner and the appendix record were 
printed under the supervision of this office. 
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To: The Chief Jubt.ice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr . Justice White 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
~r. Justice Blackmun 
/ Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: Mr. Justice Stewart 
Circulat ed: 1 6 MAY 1978 
1st DRAFT . 
Rec1rculated: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~ 
No. 77-5353 
Rufus Junior Mincey, Petitioner, I On Writ of Certiorari to 
v. the Supreme Court of 
State of Arizona. Arizona. 
[May -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court. 
On the afternoon of October 28, 1974, undercover police 
officer Ba.rry Headricks of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics 
Squad knocked on the door of an apartment in Tucson, Ariz., 
occupied by the petitioner, Rufus Mincey. Earlier in the day, 
Officer Headricks had allegedly arranged to purchase a quan-
tity of heroin from Mincey and had left, ostensibly to obtain 
money. On his return he was accompanied by nine other 
plainclothes policemen and a deputy county attorney. The 
door was opened by John Hodgman, one of three acquaintances 
of Mincey who were in the living room of the apartment. 
Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the 
bedroom. Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to 
keep the other officers from entering. but was pushed back 
against the wall. As the police entered the apartment, a rapid 
volley of shots was heard from the bedroom. Officer 
Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor. When other 
officers entered the bedroom they found Mincey lying on the 
floor. wounded and semiconscious. Officer Headricks died a 
few hours later in the hospital. 
The petitioner was indicted for murder. assault/ and three 
counts of narcotics oft'enses. He was tried at a single trial and 
1 The assault charge was based on t.he wounding of a person in the living; 
1-oom who was hit by a bullet that came through the wall. 
,I 
¢" 
: rr,. ' ... 
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convicted on all the charges. At his trial and on appea.I. he 
contended that evidence used against him had been unlawfully 
seized from his apartment without a warrant and that state-
ments used to impeach his credibility were inadmissible 
because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on 
state-law grounds,2 but affirmed the narcotics convictions. 115 
Ariz. 472, 566 P. 2d 273. It held that the warrantlAss search 
of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and that Mincey's statements were 
voluntary. We granted certiorari to consider these substantial 
constitutional questions. - U. S. -. 
I 
The first question presented is whether the search of 
Mincey's apartment was constitutionally permissible. After 
the shooting, the narcotics agents, thinking that other persons 
in the apartment might have been injured, looked about 
quickly for other victims. They found a young woman 
wounded in the bedroom closet and Mincey apparently uncon-
scious in the bedroom, as well as Mincey's three acquaintances 
(one of whom had been wounded in the head) in the living 
room. Emergency assistance was requested and some medical 
aid administered to Officer Headricks. But the agents re-
frained from further iuvestigation. pursuant to a Tucson 
Police Department directive that police officers should not 
· investigate incidents in which they are involved. They neither 
searched further nor seized any evidence; they merely guarded 
the suspects and the premises. 
Within 10 minutes. however, homicide detectives who had 
heard a radio report of the shooting arrived and took charge 
2 The 8tat.e a.ppellate court. h<:>ld that the jury ha.d been improperly 
instructed on crimina.! intent.. Tt a.pprars from the record in this case 
that. the retrial of the petition<:>r on the murdrr and assault charges waa 
1;1ta¥ed b~r the tr~a.l cqurt. after cert.~orari was gr:mtrd by this Court. 
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of the investigation. They supervised the removal of Offi-
cer Headricks and the suspects. trying to make sure that the 
scene was disturbed as littlE' as possible, and then proceeded to 
gather evidence. Their search lasted four days,u during which 
period the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and 
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cup-
boards, and inspected th0ir contents; they emptied clothing 
pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; 
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for 
examination. Every item in the apartment was closely exam-
ined and inventoried. and two to three hundred objects were 
seized. In short, Mincey's apartment was subjected to an 
exhaustive and intrusive search. No warrant was ever 
obtained. 
The petitioner's pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of 
this search was denied after a hearing. Much of the evidence 
introduced against. him at trial (including photographs and 
diagrams, bullets and shell casings. guns, narcotics, and nar-
cotics paraphernalia) was thE' product of the four-day search 
of his apartment. On appeal. the Arizona Supreme Court 
reaffirmed previous decisions in which it had held tha.t the 
warrantless search of the scene of a homicide is constitution-
ally permissible.4 It stated its ruling as follows: 
"We hold a reasonable. warrantless search of the scene of 
a homicide-or of a serious personal injury with likeli-
hood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play-
:J The police abo returned to the apartment in November 1974, at the 
rcque:-;1. of the petitioner's landlord, to remove property of the> petit.ioner 
that. remnin<:>d in the apartment after· his lease had expired on October 31. 
·I State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P. 2d 44 ; State ex rel. Bel'ger v. 
S·uperior Coul't , 110 Ariz . 281, 517 P . 2d 1277 ; State v. Duke, 110 Ariz . 
a20, 518 P. 2d 570. Tlw Court of Appeal~ fO'r the> Ninth Circuit rever;;ed 
tlw denia.l of a petrtion for a writ of habrnH corpus filed by the defendant 
whose conviction was upheld in State v. Sample, supra, on th(' ground , 
inter alia, that the warmntle;;s search of the homicide ;;cene violated tho 






MINCEY v. ARIZONA 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution where the law enforcement officers 
were legally on the premises in the first instance. . . . 
For the search to be reasonable. the purpose must be 
limited to determining the circumstances of death and the 
scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must 
also begin within a reasonable period following the time 
when the officials first lea.rn of the murder (or potential 
murder)." 115 Ariz., at 482,566 P. 2d, at 283. 
Since the investigating homicide detectives knew that Officer 
Headricks was seriously injured. began the search promptly 
upon their arrival at the apartment, and searched ouly for 
evidence either establishing thE' circumstances of death or 
"relevant to motiv() and intent or knowledge (narcotics, e. g.)," 
id., a.t 483, 566 P. 2d, at 284, the court found that the warrant-
'less search of the petitioner's apartment had not violated the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment proscribes all 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal prin-
ciple that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approva.l by judge or magistrate. are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to 
a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351; see also Marshall v. 
Barlow's, Inc., -- U. S. -,- (slip op. 4-5); Michigan v. 
Tyler,- U.S.-.- (slip op. 6); Cool1'dge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U. S. 443, 481; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U. S. 523. 528- 529·. The Arizona Supreme Court did not hold 
that the search of the petitioner's apartment fell within any 
of the exceptions to the warrant requirement previously recog-
nized by this Court. but rather that the search of a homicide 
scene should be recognized as an additional except!9.n. Sev-
eral reasons are advanced by the State to meet its "burden ... 
to show the existence of such an exceptional situation" as to· 
j ustify creating .a new exception to the warrant requirement_ 
T 
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See Vale v. Louisia:na, 399 U.S. 30, 34; Jeffers Y. United States, 
342 U. S. 48, 51. None of t.hese reasons. however. persuades 
us of the validity of the generic exception delineated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court. 
The first contention is that the search of the petitioner's 
apartment did not invade any constitutionally protected right 
of privacy. See Katz v. United States, supra. This argument 
appears to have two prongs. On the one hand, the State 
urges that by shooting Officer Headricks iu his apartment, 
Mincey forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy. We 
have recently rejected a similar waiver argument in Michigan, 
v. Tyler, supra, at - (slip op. 5-6); it suffices here to say 
that this reasoning would impermissibly convict the suspect 
even before the evidence against him was gathcred. 5 On the 
other hand, the State contends that the police entry to arrest 
Mincey was so great an invasion of his privacy that the addi-
tional intrusiou caused by the search was constitutionally 
irrelevant. But this claim is hardly tenable in light of the 
extensive nature of this search. It is one thing to say that 
one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened 
right of privacy in his person. Se~ United States v. Edwards, 
415 U. S. 800. 808-809: United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened 
right of privacy in his entire house. Indeed this very argu-
ment was rejected when it was advauced to support the 
warrantless search of a dwelling where an arrest occurred as 
"incident" to the arrest of its occupant. Chirnel v. California, 
395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12. Thus, this search cannot be justified 
on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of 
privacy was invaded. 
r. Moreover, this rationale would UP inapplicable if a homicide occurred 
at the home of the victim or of :1 :otranger, yet. the Arizona ca~es indicate 
tlutt. a. warrant]e:;i:i search in ~uch :1 ea:;e would abo be permi:;:;ible under 
the ·'murder scrne f'XCPption." Cf. State v. Sample, supra, at 409, 48!} 
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The State's second argument iu support of Arizona's cate- ~- i,A/ 
gorical exception to the warrant requirement is tha.t a possi- ~~· 
ble homicide presents an emergency situation demanding 
immediate action. We do not question the right of the police ~ 
to respo_12_d to emergency situations. Numerous state 11 and - - ~ ~ ,/ • 
federal 7 cases nave recognized that the Fourth Amendment (./Z~ 
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries 
and searches when they reasonably believe that a. person 
within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police 
come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt 
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims 
or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 
supra, at - (slip op. 9-10). "The need to protect or pre-
serve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would 
otherwise be illegal conduct absent an exigency or emergency." 
Wayne v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 234. 241, 318 
F. 2d205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.). 
But a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by 
6 E. g., People Y. Hill. 12 Cal. 3d 731, 52R P. 2d 1; Patrick v. State, 227 
A. 2d 486 (Del. 1967): People v. Brooks, 7 Illl. App. 3d 767, 289 N. E. 
2d 207; Maxey v. State, 244 N. E. 2d 650 (Ind.); Davis Y. ~tate, 23(i Md. 
389. 204 A. 2d 7G; ~tate\'. Hardin, 518 P. 2d 151 (Nev.); State v. Gosser, 
50 N .• T. 438, 23G A. 2d 377; People v. Mitchell, 89 N.Y. 2d 17:3, 347 N. E. 
2d 607; State v. Pires, 55 Wi:s. 2d 597, 201 N. W. 2d 153. Other casr;; are 
collectrd in Notr. The Emergency Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure, and 
the Fourth Amendment, 4:~ Ford. L. Rev. 571, 584 11. 12. See alHo ALI 
Modrl Codr of Pre-arraignml'nt Proredurr § SS 2()0.5 (Prop. Off. Draft 
1975) . By citing thr~e ea:><'t< and tho~e in the notr following, of cour ·e, 
we do not mran to approvr 1.he sprcifir holding" of earh CHH('. 
7 E. g., Root v. Ga'Uper, 438 F. 2d a111, 364-8G5 (CAS); United States v. 
Barone, 330 F. 2cl 54;~ (CA2); Wayne v. United 8tates. 115 lT. S. App. 
D . C. 234, 23R-24:3, :w~ F. 2d 205, 209-214 (opinion of Bmgc>r, .T.); 
United States \". Jame~;. 408 F. Supp. 527 (SD Aii:sH.) ; United 8tates ex 
rel. Parson v. Anderson, ;~54 F. Supp. 10()0, 10~6-10H7 (Del.), aff'd, 481 
F . 2cl 94 (CA3) ; ::;er "J!Varden Y. Hayden. 8H7 U.S. 294, 298-299; McDon-
ald v. United States, ~~35 U. S. 451, 456; Johnson \'. United States, 33:$ 
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the exigencies which justify its initiation." Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U. S. 1, 25-26,s and it simply cannot be contended that this 
search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb. 
All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before 
the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began 
their search. And a four-day search that included opening 
dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rational-
ized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emer-
gency search. 
Third, the State points to the vital public interest in the 
prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of mur-
der. No one can doubt the importance .of this goal. But 
the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes 
is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene 
is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a 
rape, a robbery, or a burglary? "No consideration relevant 
to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational lim-
itation" of such a doctrine. Chimel v. California, supra, at 
766. 
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made 
more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampsh,;re, 403 
U. S., at 481. The investigation of crime would always be 
simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth 
Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of 
Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may 
not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity 
in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 6-11. For this reason, warrants are 
generally required to search a. person's home or his person 
unless "the exigencies of the situation'' make the needs of law 
8 The police may of cour;:;e, Heize evidence that is in plain view during 
the course of their err1 1mate emer"'enc · ac .Jvi 1es. . w !gan v. yler. 
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable und~r the Fourth Amendment. M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15. See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 
supra (search of arrested suspect and area within his control 
for weapons or evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 
298-300 ("hot purs!}it." of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U. S. 757, 770--771 (imminent destruction of evi-
dence); see also supra, at 6-7. 
Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was 
a homicide, there were no exisent circumstances in this ca~e, 
as, indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court recognized. 115 Ariz., 
at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283. · There was no indication that evi-
dence would be lost, destroyed or removed during the time 
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard 
a artment minimized that possibility. And a search 
warrant could eas1 y and convemen y ave been obtained. 
See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-1444 (C) (Supp. 1973). We 
decline to hold that the seriousness of the offense under invea-
tigation itself crea.tes ·exigent circumstances of the kind that 
under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search. 
Finally, the State argues that the "murder scene exception'' 
is constitutionally permissible because it is narrowly confined 
by the guidelines set forth in the decision of the Arizona 
Supreme Court, see supra, at 3-4.n In light of the extensive 
search that took place in this case it may be questioned what 
protection the guidelines afford a person in whose home a 
homicide or assault occurs. Indeed, these so-called guidelines 
are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to assert. 
They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer 
to interpret such terms as "reasonable ... search,''' "serious 
0 The State abo relies on the fact that ob~ervancc of these guidelines can 
be enforced by ft. motion to :suppress evidence. But. the Fourth Amend-
ment " is designed to prevent, not :simply to redre:s;; , unlawful police a,ction ." 
Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12. 
7 
77-5353-0PINION 
MINCEY v. ARIZONA 9 
personal injury with likelihood of death where there is reasoH 
to suspect foul pla.y," and "reasonable period." It is precisely 
this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and 
scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires be made by a neutral aud objective magistrate, not a 
police officer. See United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 9. 
It may well be that the circumstances described by the 
Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally 
sufficient to warrant a search of substantial scope. But the 
Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each case 
be made in the first instance by a neutral magistrate. 
"The point of the Fourth Amendment. which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers. is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra, 
at 13-14. 
In sum, we hold that the "murder scene exception" created 
by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments-that the warrantless search of 
Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible sim-
ply because a homicide had recently occurred there.10 
II 
Since there will presumably be a new trial in this case,11 it 
is appropriate to consider also the petitioner's contention that 
statements he made from a hospital bed were involuntary, and 
10 To what extrnt the rviclcnce found during this ;;cnrch rna~· have bren 
permissibly tieized undrr establi:;hed Fourth AmPnclmrnt titandards will 
be for the Arizona court~ to rr:<olvc on rcma.nd. 
11 See aJ~;o n . 2, supra. 
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therefore could not constitutionally be used against him at 
his trial. 
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and 
taken immediately t.o the emergency room where he was 
examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip, 
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis 
of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help 
him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep 
him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder 
through his penis. He received various drugs, and a. needle 
and tube were placed in his arm so that he could be fed intra-
venously. He was then taken to the intensive care unit. 
At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the 
Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to 
interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the 
tube in his mouth, and so he responded to Detective Rust's 
questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by 
the hospital.12 Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the 
murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, and began to ask questions 
about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment 
a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repeatedly that 
the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust con-
tinued to question him until almost midnight. 
After a pretrial hearing. see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 
the trial court found that Mincey had responded to this inter-
roga.tion voluntarily.13 When Mincey took the witness stand 
12 Becau~P of the wa.y in which tlw intrrrogation was conducted, the only 
contemporaneous rPrord con~isted of Minrpy's writtPn answer~. Hu~t tes-
tifiPd that the next dn~· he went over thi~ docHmPnt and made a few notes 
to help ]urn reconstruct the conversation. In n written report dated nbout 
a week later, Hu~t transcribed Minrry's nnswrrs and addPd the questions 
he behPved hr had a~ked. It wns tin~ written report that was used to 
cro:;~-Pxamiup Mince~· nt his subsequent. trial. 
1 '1 The trial court made no findings of fact, nor did it make a specific 
finding of voluntarjne:,;s, and the rwtitionc·r contends thnt ,admission of the 
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a.t his trial his statements in l'<'sponse to Detective Rust's 
questions were used in an effort to impeach his testimony in 
several respects.'' On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court 
indicated its belief that because Detective Hust had failed to 
honor Mincey's request for a lav,·yer, the statements would 
have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's ca.se in 
chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. But, relying on Harris v. 
New York, 401 U.S. 222. aud Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 
it held that since the trial court's fiuding of voluntariness was 
not "clear[ly] and manifestrly] '' erroneous the statements 
were properly used for purposes of impeachment. 115 Ariz., 
at 479-480, 566 P. 2d, at 280--281. 
Statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating 
the strictures of Miranda Y. Arizona, supra, are admissible for 
impeachment if their "trustworthiness ... satisfies legal stand-
, ards." Harris v. New York, supra, at 224; Oregon v. Hass, 
supra, at 722. But any criminal trial use against a defendant 
of his involuntary statemeut. is a denial of due process of law 
statements th<.'r<:>fore violated Jackson v. Denno, il7g U. S. 368. We agree 
with the Anzona Supreme Court, bowt>vrr, that the finding of volun-
tarine;s "appearr>;l from thr record with unmiHtakable clarity." Sims v. 
Georgia, 385 U. S. 5ilR. 544. Thr pc·titioner had originall~· moved to 
suppress hio; written an:-;wer~ to Rust'~ questions on two grounds: that 
they had brm rlicited in violnt.ion of Miranda "· Arizona, 384 U. S. 436, 
and that thry had been involuntary. During thr !waring. th€' pro~f'cution 
stipulatrd that th€' an:,;wrr~ would hP u:,;rd only to imprach thr ]Wtitioner 
if hr took thr witnr~s stand. An~· violation of Miranda thus bf'came 
irrrlrvant. OrPgon v. !lass. 420 n. S. 714; llarris "· Nev: York, 401 U.S. 
222. Tlw trstimony and the bripf:,; and argumPntH of roun~rl werr thrrf'-
aftrr dirrctrd sol<:>ly to whrt lwr t hr answPrs bad be<'l1 volunt nrily givrn, 
and thr court :specifieall~· ruled tha.t thp~· would b<' admis:siblr for impPach-
ment JHlrpo,.;~ on!~·. The eourt thu~ nrer~Raril~· held that ~Iinrey'~ rP-
Hpon,.;r::; to Hu~:<t 'o; mterrogation wrrr Yoluntary. 
11 In hght of our holding that \linrf'y 's hospitnl statrment~ wrr<' not 
voluntarily given, it is unner~~a~· to rrach hi::< alternatP content.ion that 
lhrir u,.;r against him was impermi~siblr brcau,;p thry wrrr not ~ufficiently 
lt1cons.btrnt with his trial testimony. 
r 
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''even though there is ample evidence aside from the confes-
sion to support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, supra, at 
377; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503. 518; Lynumn v. 
Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 537; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 
190; see Chapman v. Californ/a, 386 U. S. 18, 23 and n. 8. 
If, therefore, Mincey's statements to Detective Rust were not 
"the product of a rat:onal intellect and a free will," Townsend 
v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 307; Blackburn'"· Alabama, 361 U. S. 
199, 208, his conviction cannot stand. In making this critical 
determination, we are not bound by the Arizona Supreme 
Court's holding that the statements were voluntary. Instead, 
this Court is under a duty to make an independent evaluation 
of the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741-
742; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 515-516. 
It is hard to imagine a situa.tion less conducive to the exer- lA 
cise of "a rational intellect and a free will" than Mincey's. V\ 
He had been seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and 
had arrived at the hospital "depressed almost to the point of 
coma,'' according to his attending physician. Although he 
had received some treatment, his condition a.t the time of 
Rust's interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was 
in the intensive care unit.' 5 He complained to Rust tha.t the 
pain in his leg was "unbearable." He was evidently confused 
and unable to think clearly about either the events of that 
afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation. since some 
of his written answers were on their face not entirely 
cohcrent.'n Finally, while Mincey was being questioned he 
tr• A nu:-se testified at the suppre::;!:iion hearing tha.t. the device used to 
aid ,vlinrC'y 'o; n~piration was reservC'd for "more critical" patients . More-
o·.·pr. ::vlincey apparrntly remained hoo;pitalized for almoo;t a month after 
thP shooting. According to docket entrie:s in the trial court hi:s arraign-
ment wa~ po:stponed several times becau!:ie he wa~ still in the hospital; he 
wa!:i not :uraigned until November 26, 1974. 
'"For example, two of the anRwers written by Mincey were: ''Do you 
me Did he give me :some money (no)" and "Ever~· body know E-·err 
hod~· ." And Mincey app:uentl~· believed he was bring que:stioned by :srv-
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was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, 
needles, and breathing apparatus. He was, in short, "at the 
complete mercy" of Detective Hust, unable to escape or resist 
the thrust of Rust's interrogation. Cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 
389 U.S. 35, 38. 
In this debilitated and helpless condition, Mincey clearly 
expressed his wish not to be interrogated. As soon as Rust's 
questions turned to the details of the afternoon's events, 
Mincey wrote: "This is all I can say without a lawyer." Hust 
nonetheless continued to question him, and a nurse who was 
present suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Min-
cey gave unresponsive or uninformative answers to several 
more questions, and then said again that he did not want to 
talk without a lawyer. Hust ignored tha.t request and another 
made immediately thereafter.,; Indeed, throughout the in-
era! different. policemen, not Hu:;t alone; although it wa~ Hu~t who told 
Mincey he had killed a policeman, la.ter in the interrogation Mincey 
indica.ted he tJ10u~ht it w:1s somronr el~r. 
17 In his reconstruction of the interrogation, ~ee u. 12, supra, Hust 
statrd that , aJtrr he m;krd iVJincey some qurstion~ to try to ident if~· one 
of the other victim:;, thr following en"ued: 
''HUST: ... What do you rem<>mhrr that ha.ppenrd? 
"1\'IINCEY: I remrmher som<>bod~· standing ov<'r me ~a.ymg ·Movr 
nigg~>r, move .' I was on the floor brside the bed. 
"HUST: Do you remembrr shooting anyonr or firing a gun? 
" MINCEY : 'I' his is all I tan say without a lawyer. 
"HUST : If you want a lawyrr now, I cannot talk to you any longer, 
howrver, you don't have to an~wrr any que:,;ticn ~ you don't want to . Do 
you st ill want to talk to me? 
"MINCEY : (Shook hi:,; head in an affirma.tivr mannf\r.) 
"HUST: What rbe can you remember'? 
" MINCEY: I 'm gonna have to put. my head together. There are so 
m any thing,.; I don 't. remrmber I like how did they grt into th<> apartment! 
"RUST: How did who grt into the apartment."! 
" MINCEY: Police. 
" RUST: Did you :;rll somr narcotic" to the guy that wa:,; shot f 
"MINCEY : Do you me, did he giw me ilome mon<>yY 
"'BUST : Yes, 
-· 
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terTogation Mincey vainly asked Rust to desist. Moreover, 
he complained several times that he was confused or unable 
to think clearly, or that he . could answer more accurately 
the next day.18 But despite Mincey's entreaties to be let 
"MINCEY: No. 
"HUST: Did you give him n sample? 
"MINCEY: What. do you rail a Ham pi<'? 
"RUST: A small amount of drug or narcotics to test? 
"MINCEY: I can't say without a lawye1·. 
"HUST: Did anyone say police or narcs when thPy came into the 
apartment? 
"MINCEY: Let m<' get m~·~elf togrtht>r first. You srr, I'm not for 
sure everything happened so fa~t. 1 can't. answrr at this time becauo;e 
I don't. think so, but I ca.n't say for :,;ure. Some qtH'stions aren't . dear to 
me at. the present time. 
"HUST: Did you shoot. nil~'one? 
"MINCEY: I can't sa.y. I have to see a lawyer." (Emphasis supplied.) 
While some of Mincey'" answPr" srem relatively responsive to the ques-
tions, it mwst. be rememberc>d that Hust added the questions at a later 
date, with the answers in front of him. SrP n. 12, supra. The reliability 
of Rust's report is uncertain. For example, Hust claimed that imme-
diately after Mincey first expresBrd a. desire to remain silent, Hust said 
Mincey need not answer an~· quE'I'tions but Mincey responded by indicnt-
ing that he wanted to continue. There is no contemporaneous record 
supporting Rust's statemmt that Mincey acted so inconsistently immedi-
atrly after a,;serting hi:s wish not to respond further, nor did the nur:se who 
was present. during the interrogation corroborate Hust. The Arizona. 
Supreme Court apparently diHb<'lirved Hust in this respect, since it stated 
that "after each indication from [Minceyl that he wanted to consult an 
attorney or that. he wanted to Rtop answrring questions, the police officer 
continued to question [him]." 115 Ariz., at 479, 566 P. 2d, at. 280 (em-
phasis supplied) . 
18 In addition to thr statrment~ qnotrd inn. 17, supra., Mincey wrote at 
various times during the int<>rrogntion: "Thrm !lrP a. lot of things tha.t 
aren't clear," "Tha.t's why I hnvo to ha.vc time to rrdo f'Vf't-ything in my 
mind," "I'm not for surr," and ·'I'm not ~uro a.~ of now." Hr also wrote: 
" If its possible to get a lawf'r isici now. W<' ran fini&h thr talk. He 
could direct me in the righf direction whrre as without a. la.wyrr I might 
saw [.sic] something thinking that. it mean~ something cl~c . " And at 
,4Jo .. , • 
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alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals 
when Mincey lost consciousuess or received medical treatment, 
and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his 
task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually 
continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded 
man on the edge of consciousness. 
There were not present in this case some of the gross abuses 
that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions in-
voluntary, such as beat,ings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 
278, or "truth serums," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 299. 
But "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an 
unconstitutional inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 
U. S., at 206. Determination of whether a statement is 
involuntary "requires more than a mere color-matching of 
cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 442. It requires careful 
evaluation of all the circumstances of the interrogation.10 
It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's 
statements were not "the product of [his] free and rational 
choice." Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 521. To the 
contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey 
wanted not to answer Detective Hust. But Mincey was weak-
ened by pain and shock, isolated from family, friends and legal 
counsel. and barely conscious. and his will was simply over-
borne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained 
as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant 
at his trial. 
IV 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Arizona 
Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for fur-
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
another point. he wrote "Lets ra.p tC'tmarrow [sicl face to face. I can't 
give fa.cts. If something ha ppins r sic T I don't know about .. " 
10 E. g., Boulden v. Holman, 394 U. S. 478, 480; Clewis v. Texas , 38() 
U. S. 707,. 708 ; Hnynes v, Wa,shington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-514. 
~upr.tttU Qfa-ttrlltf tlr.t :J.ni:t.t?t ~bd.tg 
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring. ~ , 
of the Court, which holds that ~ 1.a. I join the opinion 
petitioner's rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments have 
been violated. I write today to emphasize a point that is 
illustrated by the instant case , but that applies more 
generally to all cases in which we are asked to review Fourth 
Amendment issues arising out of state criminal convictions. 
It is far from clear that we would have granted certiorari 
solely to resolve the Fifth Amendment issue in this case, for 
that could have been resolved on federal habeas corpus. With 
regard to the Fourth Amendment issue, however, we had little 
choice but to grant certiorari, because our decision in Stone 
v. Powell, 428 u.s. 465 (1976), precludes federal habeas review 
of such issues. In Stone the Court held that, "where the State 
has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted 
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence 
obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was 
introduced at his trial." Id. at 494. Because of this 
holding, petitioner would not have been able to present to a 
federal habeas court the Fourth Amendment claim that the Court 
today upholds. 
The additional responsibilities placed on this Court in the 
wake of Stone become apparent upon examination of decisions of 
the Arizona Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment issue 
presented here. The Arizona court created its "murder scene 
exception" in a 1971 case. State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 
489 P.2d 44, 46-47. A year later, when the defendant in that 
case sought federal habeas corpus relief, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the exception 
could not be upheld under the Fourth Amendment. Sample v. 
Eyman, 469 F.2d 819, 821-822 (1972). When the Arizona Supreme 
Court next gave plenary consideration to the issue, prior to 
our decision in Stone, it apparently felt bound by the Ninth 
Circuit's Sample decision, although it found the case before it 
to be distinguishable . State v. Duke, 110 Ariz. 320, , 518 
p. 2d 57 0, 57 4 ( 19 7 4) .1 
When the Arizona Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
the instant case, however, it took a different approach. The 
decision, issued nearly a year after Stone, merely noted that 
the Ninth Circuit had "disagreed" with the Arizona court's view 
of the validity of the murder scene exception. 115 Ariz. 
472, n.4, 566 P.2d 273, 283 n.4 (1977). It thus created an 
effective "conflict" for us to resolve. Cf. Sup. Ct. Rule 
19.l(b). If certiorari had not been granted, we would have 
left standing a decision of the State's highest court on a 
question of federal constitutional law that had been resolved 
in a directly opposing way by the highest federal court having 
special resposibility for the State. Regardless of which 
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court's view of the Constitution was the correct one, such 
nonuniformity on important Fourth Amendment questions is 
obviously undesirable; it is as unfair to state propecutors and 
judges -- who must make difficult determinations regarding what 
evidence is subject to exclusion -- as it is to state criminal 
defendants. 
Prior to Stone v. Powell, there would have been no need to 
grant certiorari in a case such as this, since the federal 
habeas remedy would have been available to the defendant. 
Indeed, prior to Stone petitioner here probably would not even 
have had to utilize federal habeas, since the Arizona courts 
were at that earlier time more inclined to follow the federal 
constitutional pronouncements of the Ninth Circuit, as 
discussed above. But Stone eliminated the habeas remedy with 
regard to Fourth Amendment violations, thus allowing state 
court rulings to diverge from lower federal court rulings on 
these issues and placing a correspondingly greater burden on 
this Court to ensure uniform federal law in the Fourth 
Amendment area. 
At the time of Stone my Brother BRENNAN wrote that 
"institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility 
that this Court can adequately oversee whether state courts 
have properly applied federal law." 428 u.s. at 526 
(dissenting opinion}; see id. at 534. Becaus ~ of these 
constraints, we will often be faced with a Hobson's choice in 
cases of less than national significance that could formerly 
have been left to the lower federal courts: either to deny 
certiorari and thereby let stand divergent state and federal 
decisions with regard to Fourth Amendment rights; or to grant 
certiorari and thereby add to our calendar, which many believe 
is already overcrowded, cases that might better have been 
resolved elsewhere. In view of this problem and others,2 I 
hope that the Court will at some point reconsider the wisdom of 
Stone v. Powell. 
- 6 -
Footnotes 
1. In its Mincey opinion, 115 Ariz. 472, , 566 P.2d 
273, 283 (1977), the Arizona Supreme Court cited as involving 
the murder scene exception one case other than Sample and 
Duke. State ex rel. Berger v. Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 281, 
517 P.2d 1277 (1974). The two sentence opinion in the latter 
case, however, provides no explanation of the underlying facts 
and does not cite to either the Arizona court's or the Ninth 
Circuit's decision in Sample. There is thus no way to 
determine whether the situation in Berger was in any way 
comparable to those in Sample, Duke, and Mincey, nor any way to 
determine whether the Berger court simply ignored the Ninth 
Circuit's Sample decision or instead, as in Duke (decided just 
two weeks after Berger), viewed Sample as distinguishable. 
2. The Stone holding has not eased the burden on the lower 
federal courts as much as the Stone majority might have hoped, 
since those courts have had to struggle over what this Court 
meant by "an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
Fourth Amendment claim," 428 U.S. at 494. See, ~, Gates v. 
Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (CA2 1977); United States ex rel. 
Petillo v. New Jersey, 562 F.2d 903 (CA3 1977); O'Berry v. 
Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (CAS 1977). 
Justice Powell, 
TM has used Mincey as a vehicle for making a cheap 
shot at Stone v. Powell. Through all sorts of speculation 
about the motivation of state supreme court judges in 
deciding federal constitutional questions, and an analysis 
of several Arizona cases decided before and after Stone, 
TM seems to imply quite strongly that state court judges 
xii are being recalcitrant in following federal habeas 
decisions because they are willing to risk it that this 
Court will not grant cert. Alternatively, TM says the 
effect of Stone is to increase the burden on this Court. 
An interesting point is TM's suggestion that this 
Court granted cert. in Mincey because the faiaxai Fourth 
Amendment question could k not be reviewed on federal 
habeas. I wrote the pool memo in Mincey, and (perhaps 
out of naivete) th~navailabi~i.t~ of federal habeas did 
~~~) 
not even enter my d. I do not know whether it entered 
the consideration of any of the Justices, other than TM. 
When an issue looks difficult or unimportant, this Court 
sometimes seems to choose the option of leaving a case to 
federal habeas. But when it is an important issue on which 
state and federal courts have ruled, and ruled differently, 
the conflict motivates the Court to grant. Even if this 
case had gone through federal habeas, it~s (or another case 
raising the murder scene exception issue) would have reached 
this Court at some point. 
Despite my view that TM's concurrence is slanted 
a 
2. 
and/highly inappropriate use of a Justice's prereogative to 
write a concurring opinion, or perhaps because of xkHx 
this view, I do not think you should counter with a concurring 
opinion defending Stone. It would turn into a side-show. 
TM's views are his wholly personal w speculation about 
the effects of Stone v. Powell, and I would hope that you 
would not think it appropriate to engage in likH a rejoinder. 
If you would like to circulate something suggesting 
your views and stating that you do not intend to respond, 
that would be a different matter. 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 77- 5353 
Rufus Junior Mincey, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiora 1 
v. the Supreme Co rt 
State of Arizona. Arizona. 
[May -, 1978] 
MR. JusTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the 
On the afternoon of October 28, 1974, undercover police 
officer Barry Headricks of the Metropolitan Area Narcotics 
Squad knocked on the door of an apartment in Tucson, Ariz., 
occupied by the petitioner. Rufus Mincey. Earlier in the day, 
Officer Headricks had allegedly arranged to purchase a quan-
tity of heroin from Mincey and had left, ostensibly to obtain 
money. On his return he was accompanied by nine other 
plainclothes policemen and a deputy county attorney. The 
door was opened by John Hodgman, one of three acquaintances 
of Mincey who were in the living room of the apartment. 
Officer Headricks slipped inside and moved quickly into the 
bedroom. Hodgman attempted to slam the door in order to 
keep the other officers from entering. but was pushed back 
against the wall. As the police entered the apartment, a rapid 
volley of shots was heard from the bedroom. Officer 
Headricks emerged and collapsed on the floor. When other 
officers entered the bedroom they found Mincey lying on the 
floor, wounded and semiconscious. Officer Headricks died a 
few· hours later in the hospitaL 
The petitioner was indicted for murder, assault.1 and three 
counts of narcotics offenses. He was tried at a single trial and 
1 The assault cbrge was bar;ed on the wounding of a. person in the living 
room who was hit by ~L bullet that came through the wall, 
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convicted on all the charges. At his trial and on appeal, he 
contended that evidence used against him had been unlawfully 
seized from his apartment without a warrant and that state-
ments used to impeach his credibility were inadmissible 
because they had not been made voluntarily. The Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed the murder and assault convictions on 
state-law grounds,2 but affirmed the narcotics convictions. 115 
Ariz. 472, 566 P. 2d 273. It held that the warrantless search 
of a homicide scene is permissible under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments and that Mincey's statements wer-e 
voluntary. We granted certiorari to consider these substantial 
constitutional questions. -U.S.-. 
I 
The first question presented is whether the search of 
Mincey's apartment was constitutionally permissible. After 
the shooting, the narcotics agents, thinking that other persons 
in the apartment might have bren injured, looked about 
quickly for other victims. They found a young woman 
wounded in the bedroom closet and Mincey apparently uncon-
scious in the bedroom. as well as Mincey's three acquaintances 
(one of whom had bern wounded in the head) in the living 
room. Emergency assistance was requested and some medical 
aid administered to Officer Heaclricks. But the a.gents re-
frained from furthrr investigation. pursuant to a Tucson 
Police Department directivr that police officers should not 
uwestigate incidents in which they arr involved. They neither 
searched further nor seized any evidence; they merely guarded 
the suspects and the premises. 
Within 10 minutes, hm.vevcr. homicide detectives who had 
heard a radio report of the shooting arrived and took charge 
2 The ~tate appc-!httr court lwld ihnt the jury had brcn improperly 
m~truct<'d on criminal int<:>nt. It a.prwar:; from tho rceorcl in this ca.se 
that tlw rPtnal of the prlit ion<'r on t lw mmdPr nnd n~sault rhargrs was: 
~taycd. hy the tn_al ronrt ·tfter rPrtiorari wa~ granted. by this Court. 
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of the investigation. They supervised the removal of Offi-
cer Headricks and the suspects, trying to make sure that the 
scene was disturbed as little as possible, and then proceeded to 
gather evidence. Their search lasted four days,'1 during which 
period the entire apartment was searched, photographed, and 
diagrammed. The officers opened drawers, closets, and cup-
boards, and inspected their contents; they emptied clothing 
pockets; they dug bullet fragments out of the walls and floors; 
they pulled up sections of the carpet and removed them for 
examination. Every item in the apartment was closely exam-
ined and inventoried, and two to three hundred objects were 
seized. In short. Mincey's apartment was subjected to an 
exhaustive and intrusive search. No warrant was ever 
obtained. 
The petitioner's pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of 
this search was denied after a hearing. Much of the evidence 
introduced against. him at trial (including photographs and 
diagrams, bullets and shell casings, guns. narcotics, and nar-
cotics paraphernalia) was tlw product of the four-day search 
of his apartment. On appeal. the Arizona Supreme Court 
reaffirmed previous decisions in which it had held that the 
warrantless search of the scene of a homicide is constitution-
ally permissible.4 It stated its ruling as follows: 
"We hold a reasonable, warrantless search of the scene of 
a homicide-or of a serious personal injury with likeli-
hood of death where there is reason to suspect foul play-
3 The police also returned to tlw n,partmf'nt in November 1974. at the 
rcque:-;t of i he petitioner'H landlord, to remove propert)' of the petit.ioner 
that. remained 111 the apartment after his !rase had expired on Ortober 31. 
1 State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489 P. 2d 44: State ex rel. Berger v. 
Superior Court, 110 Ariz. 2~1, 517 P. 2d 1277; State v. DukP, 110 Ariz. 
:~20, 51H P. 2d 570. The Conrt of Appeals for the Ninth Cirruit reversed 
the d<·nial of a petJtion for a writ of habeas rorpu~ filed b)' the defendant 
who~<' conviction was upheld in State v. Sample, supra, on the ground, 
inter alia, that the warrnntless search of the homicidc scene violated the· 
FotJl!tb nud Fouctcenth Amendment::>·. Sample v.. Eyman, 469 F. 2cl8IK 
4 
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does Hot violate the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution where the law enforcement officers 
were legally on the premises in the first instance. . . . 
For the search to be reasonable, the purpose must be 
limited to determining the circumstances of death and the 
scope must not exceed that purpose. The search must 
also begin within a reasonable period following the time 
when the officials first learn of the murder (or potential 
murder)." 115 Ariz., at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283. 
Since the investigating homicide detectives knew that Officer 
Headricks was seriously injured, began the search promptly 
upon their arrival at the apartment. and searched only for 
evidence either establishing the circumstances of death . or 
"relevant to motiv8 and intent or knowledge (narcotics, e. g.)," 
id., at 483. 566 P. 2d, at 284, the court found that the warra.nt-
Jess search of the petitioner's apartment had not violated the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
We cannot agree. The Fourth Amendment proscribes all 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal prin-
ciple that "searches conducted outside the judicial process. 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate. are per se 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to 
a. few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 
Katz v. United States, 389 P. S. 347, 357; see also South 
/)akota v. Opperman, 428 U. S. 364, 381 (POWELL. J .. con-
curr~ng); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443. 481; 
I' ale v. LoU?.siana, 399 F. S. 30, 34; Terry Y. Oh1'o, 392 e. S. 
1, 20; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U. S. 699, 705. The 
Arizona Supreme Court did not hold that the search of the 
petitioner's apartment fell withi11 any of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirenwnt previously recognized by this Court. but 
rather that the search of a homicide scene should be recog-
1 nized as an adclitiollal exception. 
Several reasons are advanced by the State t.o meet its "bur-
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as to .i ustify creating a IH?w Pxception to the warrant require-
ment. See Vale v. Lou1:siana, supra, at 34; Jeffers Y. United 
States, 342 r. S. 48, 51. None of these reasons, however, 
persuades us of the validity of the getwric exception delineated 
by the Arizona Supreme Court. 
The first contention is that the search of the petitioner's 
apartment did not invade any constitutionally protected right 
of privacy. Sec Katz v. U11ited States, supra. This argument 
appea.rs to have two prongs. On the one hall(!. the State 
urgf's that by shooting Officer Headricks, Mincey forfeited 
any reasonable expectation of privacy in his apartment. We 
have recently rejected a similar waiver argument in Michigan 
v. Tyler, - LJ. S. -. (slip op. 5-6); it suffices here to say 
that this reasoning would impermissibly con viet the suspect 
even before the evidence against him was gathered." On the 
other hand, the State contends that the police e11try to arrest 
Mincey was so great an invasion of his privacy that the addi-
tional intrusion caused by the search was coiJstitutionally 
irrelevant. But this claim is hardly tenable in light of the 
extensive nature of this search. It is one thing to say that 
one who is legally taken into police custody has a lessened 
right of privacy in his person. SeP United States v. Edwards, 
415 U. S. 800, 808-809; United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 
218. It is quite another to argue that he also has a lessened 
right of privacy in his entire house. Indeed this very argu-
ment was rejected whe11 it was advanced to support the 
warrantless search of a dwelling where an arrest occurred as 
"incident" to the arrest of its occupant. Chimel v. California, 
395 U. S. 752, 766 n. 12. Thus, this search cannot be justified 
on the ground that no constitutionally protected right of 
pnvacy was mvaded . 
r. t'vlorrovrr, th1~ rat10nak would bP inapphcablr if a homicide occurred 
at the homr of the victim or of a ~trangc>r, ypt. tlw Arizona ca~e~ indicate 
that. n wa.rrnntlrtiR H<'a reb in ~uch a cao;e would al:so br permi~::;iblc under 
thr " murdC'r ~;ceue rxcPption ." Cf. State v. Sample, 8Upra, at 409, 48!) 
P . 2d, ut 46 
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The State's second argument in support. of Arizona's cate-
gorica.l exception to the warrant requirement is tha.t a possi-
ble homicide presents an emergency situation demanding 
immediate action. We do not question the right of the police 
to respond to emergency situations. ~umerous state" and 
fedeml 7 cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment 
does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries 
and searches when they reasonably believe that a person 
within is in need of immediat.e aiel. Simila.rly, when the police 
come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt 
warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims 
or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 
supra, at- (slip op. 9-10). "The need to protect or pre-
serve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would 
otherwise be illegal conduct absent an exigency or emergency." 
Wayne v. United States, 115 U. S. App. D. C. 234, 241, 318 
F. 2d 205. 212 (opinion of Burger. J.). And the police ma.y I 
seize any cviclc~llce that is in pla.in view during the course of 
G E. g., People v. Hill, 12 Cal. 3d 7:n. 528 P. 2d 1; Patrick v. State, 227 
A. 2d 486 (DeL 1967); People v. Brooks, 7 Illl. App. 3d 767, 289 N . E. 
2d 207; Ma.te!J Y. State, 244 N. E. 2d fi50 (Ind.); Davis v. State, 236 Md. 
389 . 204 A. 2d 76; State v. Hardin. 51H P. 2d 151 (Nev.); State v. Gosser, 
50 N. J. 438,236 A. 2cl a77; People''· Mitchell, 39 K. Y. 2d 17::l, :347 N. K 
2d 607; State v. Pi1·e:s, 55 Wi~. 2d 597,201 K. W. 2d 153. OtbN cases are 
collected in ~ote . The Emergeney Doctrine, Civil Search and Seizure , and 
the Fourth Amendment, 43 Ford. L. Hev. 571, 5S4 n. 12. See al,.:;o ALI 
Model Code of Pre-arraignmt'nt Procedure § SS 260.5 (Prop. Off. Draft 
J 975) . By riting the~e cases and those in thP not~, following, of cour~c, 
WP do not ml'<lll to approve t.he spc·cific holding of each ca~r. 
7 E. g., Root v. Ga'uper. 438 F. 2d :361, 364-365 (CAS); United States v. 
Barone, 3:)0 F. 2d 54;3 (CA2); Wayne v. United States. 115 U. S. App. 
D , C. 234, 23S-24:l, :n~ F. :2cl 205. 209-214 (opinion of BurgN, .T.); 
United States v . James. 40H F. Supp. 527 (SD i\li~::-:.) ; United States ex 
rel. Parson 1' . Anderson. :l54 F. Supp. lOfiO, lONfi-1087 (Del.), nff'cl, 481 
F . 2d 94 (CA3): ~ee Warden Y. Haydeu, 387 U . S. 294, 29H-299: McDon-
ald v. United States , 335 U. S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United States, 333, 
~ r. s. 10, 14-15. 
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th cir legitim a tR em0rge ncy activities. Michigan v. Tyler, 
supra, at- (slip op. 9); Coolidge Y. Xe1u Hampsh1"re, supra, 
at 465-466. 
But a warrantless search must be "strictly circumscribed by 
the exigenci<'s which .)us~ify its initiatiou," Terry v. Ohio, 392 \ ~"""" 
U. S .. at 25-26, and It Simply cannot be contended that this 
search was justified by any emergency threatening life or limb. 
All the persons in Mincey's apartment had been located before 
the investigating homicide officers arrived there and began 
their search. And a four-da.y search that included opening 
dresser drawers and ripping up carpets can hardly be rational-
ized in terms of the legitimate concerns that justify an emer-
gency search. 
Third, the State points to the vital public interest in the 
prompt investigation of the extremely serious crime of mur-
der. No one can doubt the importanc<' of this goal. But 
the public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes 
is comparable. If the warrantless search of a homicide scene 
is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of the scene of a 
rape, a robbery, or a burglary'? "No consideration relevant 
to the Fourth Amendment suggests any point of rational lim-
itation" of such a doctrine. Chirnel v. California, supra, at 
766. 
Moreover, the mere fact that law enforcement may be made 
more efficient call never by itself justify disregard of the 
Fourth Amendment. Cf. Coolidge Y. 1\'ew Hampshire, supra, 
at 481. The investigation of crime would always be simpli-
fied if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amend-
ment rpflect~ the view of those who wrote the Bill of 
Rights that tlw privacy of a person's home and property may 
not be totally sacrificed in the name of ma.ximurn simplicity 
in enforcement of the criminal law. See United States v. 
Chadwick, 433 t:. S. 1, C}-11. For this reason, warrants are 
generally required to search a. person's home or his person 
t~nlesf) "thE' exigencies of the situation" make the needs of law: 
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enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is 
objectively reasonable unde•· the Fourth Amendment. M c-
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456; Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U. S. 10, 14-15. See, e. g., Chimel v. California, 
supra (search of arrested suspect and area within his control 
for weapons or evidence); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298-300 ("hot pursuit." of fleeing suspect); Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (imminent destruction of evi-
dence); see also supra, at 6-7. 
Except for the fact that the offense under investigation was 
a homicide, there w<>re no exigent circumstances in this case, 
as, indeed, the A1·izona Supreme Court recognized. 115 Ariz., 
at 482, 566 P. 2d, at 283. Ther0 was no indication that evi-
dence would be lost. destroyed or removed during the time 
required to obtain a search warrant. Indeed, the police guard 
at the apartment minimized that possibility. And there is ] 
no suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and con-
veniently have been obtaiMcl. We declin<> to bold that the 
seriousness of the offellSC' under investigation itself creates 
exigent circumstances of th0 kind that under the Fourth 
Amendment justify a. warra11tlcss search. 
Finally, the State argues that the "murder scene exception" 
is constitutionally permissible b<>causc it is narrowly confined 
by the guidelines s<>t forth in the decision of the Arizona 
Supreme Court, sec supra, at 3-4.' In light of tlw extensive 
search that took place in this case it may be questioned what 
protection the guidelines afford a person in whose home a 
homicide or assault occurs. Jndeecl, these so-called guidelines 
are hardly so rigidly confining as the State seems to assert. 
They confer unbridled discretion upon the individual officer 
to interpret such terms as "reasonable ... search," "serious 
~ Thr Statr al:-;o rrltr~ on t.hr fact that ob8Prvance of the;;e g11idrlincs can 
be enforced by a mot ion to :-;up pres~ evidmre. But the Fourth Amend-
ment "Is designed to prcv<'nt, not ;;imply to rrdrr:-;:-; , unlawful polico tLction." 
Ch11nel v California, ;)95 (J S. 752, 7o6 n. 12. 
77-5:~5a-OPINION 
MINCEY v. AJUZONA 9 
personal in.iury with likelihood of death where there is reason 
to suspect foul play," and "reasonable period." It is precisely 
this kind of judgmental assessment of the reasonableness and 
scope of a proposed search that the Fourth Amendment re-
quires be made by a nrutral a11d objective magistra.te, not a 
police officer. See. e. g., United States Y. United States Dis-I 
trict Court, 407 U.S. 297. ~16; Coolidge , .. .\'ew Hampshire, 
supra, at 449-453; Mancus1. Y. DeForle, 392 U.S. 364, 371; 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 "G. S. 471, 481-482. 
It may well be that the circumstances described by the 
Arizona Supreme Court would usually be constitutionally 
sufficient to warraut a search of substantial scope. But the 
Fourth Amendment requires that this judgment in each case 
be made in the first instance by a neutral rnagistratc. 
"The point of thP Fourth Amendment, which often is 
not grasped by zealous officers. is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which 
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protectiou con-
sists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged 
by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime." Johnson v. United States, supra, 
at 13- 14. 
In sum, we hold that the "murder scene exception" created 
by the Arizona Supreme Court is inconsistent with the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendmrnts-that. the warrantless search of 
Mincey's apartment was not constitutionally permissible sim-
ply because a homicide had recently occurred there.u 
II 
Since thrre will presumably be a new trial in this case,10 it 
u To what extent, if any, the evicl<·nrt' found in Miucey's apartmt>nt was; I 
permissibly seized undPr C'lltablishcd Fourth Amendment standards will 
be for thE' Arizona courts lo re:~olve on remand. 
Jo fiee abo n. 2, supra. 
'.• 
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is appropriate to consider also the petitioner's contention that 
statements he rnade from a hospital bed were involuntary, and 
therefore could not constitutionally be used against him at 
his trial. 
Mincey was brought to the hospital after the shooting and 
taken immediately to the emergency room where he was 
examined and treated. He had sustained a wound in his hip, 
resulting in damage to the sciatic nerve and partial paralysis 
of his right leg. Tubes were inserted into his throat to help 
him breathe, and through his nose into his stomach to keep ' 
him from vomiting; a catheter was inserted into his bladder.! 
He received various drugs, and a device was attached to his 
arm so that he could be fed intravenously. He was then 
taken to the intensive care unit. 
At about eight o'clock that evening, Detective Hust of the 
Tucson Police Department came to the intensive care unit to 
interrogate him. Mincey was unable to talk because of the 
tube in his mouth, and so hP responded to Detective Rust's 
questions by writing answers on pieces of paper provided by 
tho hospital." Hust told Mincey he was under arrest for the 
murder of a police officer, gave him the warnings required by 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, and began to ask questions 
about the events that had taken place in Mincey's apartment 
a few hours earlier. Although Mincey asked repea.tedly that 
the interrogation stop until he could get a lawyer, Hust con-
tinued to question him until almost midnight. 
After a pretrial hearing. see Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 
the trial court found that Mincey had responded to this inter-
11 Becan~e of thr way 111 which the interrogation wa:; conducted, the only 
coatemporaneons record coni:II~ted of Mincey's written an::;werH. Hu~1 tes-
tified that the nrxt day he went over thi::; clocunwnt and made a f'pw notes 
to help hun recon::;t.ruc1 the convpr::;ation. ln a written rPport dated about 
a week later. Hu:st tran~cribed Mince~·'R au:;wrr::; and addPd thP question~ 
he be!Ievrd he had a::;krd. It wa~; thi::; writtE'n report that was u::;ed to 
cro~:,;-rxamine Mincey at his subsequent. trial 
i7-505:~-0PIN10J r 
::VHNCEY v. AHIZONA 11 
rogation voJuntarily. 1 '! vYhen Mincey took the witness stand 
at his trial his statements in response to Detective Rust's 
questions were used in an effort to imprach his testimony in 
several respects. 1" On appeal. tlw Arizona Supreme Court 
indicated its belief that because Detective Rust had failed to 
honor Mincey's request for a lawyer. the statements would 
have been inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case in 
chief. Miranda v. Arizona, supra. But, relying on Harris v. 
New York, 401 1;. S. 222, a11d Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 
it held that since the trial court's finding of voluntariness was 
not "clear[ly] ami manifest[ly _I" 0rroneous the statements 
were properly used for purposes of impeachment. 115 Ariz., 
at 479-480, 566 P. 2d, at 280-281. 
Statements made by a defendant in circumstances violating 
the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, are admissible for 
impeachment if their "trustworthiness ... satisfies legal stand-
ftrds." Harris v. Xew Y01·k, supra, at 224; Oregon v. Hass, 
1 ~ Thr t.rial court made no findiug~ of fart, nor did it make a ~pecifir 
finding of voluntarinr~~. aml thr peiitionc·r contend~ that adrni;;;;ion of the 
~tatement~ t hrrrforr viola.trd Jackson "· DPIIIW. :~7R U. S. :36R. We agree 
with the Arizona Supreme Court, howPv<•r, that the finding of volun-
tarine;;s "appearr;;l from thr reconl with IJllmi~takable elarit~· ." Sims v. 
Georgia, :385 U. S. 53R , 5-l-!. Thr pPt it ionrr had originall~· moved to 
:;upprNis hi~ wnttf•n nn::-wc'r::< to Hust'::< questiou~ on two grounds: that 
the~· had been rlirited in violation of Miranda \'.Arizona, 3H4 1.1. S. 436, 
and that they had hern involuutar~· . During tlw )waring. thr prosecution 
~t1pula.tPd that the an~wer::< would lw ll~Pd onl~· to imprach tlw prtitionrr 
1f he took the witness stand. An.1· violatwn of Miranda thus brcamr 
1rrelrvant. Ore(Jon v. !lass, -1,20 ll. S. 7J4; llan·is "· Neu• York, 401 U.S. 
222. The te:;timony and the hrirf~:< aud nrguments of couucel wrre thrre--
aftrr directed solely to whether tbr a.ni:\wrrs had been voluntarily given, 
and th<' eonrt specificall~· n110d that they would be ndmi~sible for impeach-
mrnt purpo,;~ only. The court tl111~< necessarily lwlcl that Mincey'~ re-
~pon::;(~ to Hu~t 's mterrogation wrrr ,·oluntnry. 
'"In light of our holding that !\finery's hospital statement~ were not 
voluntanl~· give11, 1l 18 unnerf'::<"HIT to rrarh hi::; altemate content.ion that 
lheJr u~P again::;t, him was Jmpermi::;siblr brrau;;r they were not sufficiently· 
incon;;istrnt with his trial testimony. 
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supra, at. 722. But. any criminal trial use against. a defendant 
of his involuntary statement. is a denial of due process of law 
"even though there is ample evidence aside from the confes-
sion to support the conviction." Jackson v. Denno, supra, at 
377; Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 518; Lynumn v. 
Illinois, 372 U. S. 528, 537; Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181. 
190; see Chapman v. California, 386 U .. S. 18. 23 and n. 8. 
If, therefore, Mincey's statements to Detective Rust were not 
"the product of a rational intellect and a free will," Townsend 
v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 307; Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 
199, 208, his conviction cannot stand. In making this critical 
determination, we are not bound by the Arizona Supreme 
Court's holding that the statements were voluntary. Instead, 
this Court is under a. duty to make an independent evaluation 
of the record. Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741-
742; Haynes v. Washington, supra, at 515-516. 
It is hard to imagine a situation less conducive to the exer-
cise of "a rational intellect and a free will" than Mincey's. 
He had been seriously wounded just a few hours earlier, and 
had arrived at the hospital "depressed almost to the point of 
coma," according to his attending physician. Although he 
had received some treatment. his condition at the time of 
Rust's interrogation was still sufficiently serious that he was 
iu the intensive care unit.''' He complained to Rust that the 
pa.ill in his leg was "unbearable." He was evidently confused 
and unable to think clea.rly about either the events of that 
afternoon or the circumstances of his interrogation, since some 
of his written a.11swers were on their face not entirely 
coherent.'" Finally, while Mincey was being questioned he 
,., A nm;;? tr~H1rd at the ~uppre~·::;ion hearing that the devicr u::;cd to 
aid Minr<:>y 's rr;;piration was reserved for "more critical" patient::;. More-
ovrr. :\1inrry appnr<:>ntly remained hoSJ1itnlized for nlmo::;t n month nftcr 
the shooting. According to docket rntrir~ in the trial court hi ::; arraign-
mrn t. w:1::; po::;tponed sevrra l times because he was still in the hospital ; he 
was not :trmigned until November 26, 1974. 
P ,Fqr exam plr, two of the answerR written by Mincey were: "Do yoLL 
• 
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was lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, 
needles, and breathing apparatus. He was, in short, "at the 
complete mercy" of Detective Rust, unable to escape or resist 
the thrust of Rust's interrogation. Cf. Beecher v. Alabama, 
389 U. S. 35, 38. 
In this debilitated and helpless coudition, Mincey clearly 
expressed his wish not to be interrogated. As soon as Rust's 
questions turned to the details of the afternoon's events, 
Mincey wrote: "This is all I can say without a lawyer.'' Rust 
nonetheless continued to question him. and a nun:e who was 
present suggested it would be best if Mincey answered. Min-
cey gave unresponsive or uninformative answers to several 
more questions, a.nd then said again tha.t he did not want to 
talk without a lawyer. Rust ignored that request a.nd another 
made immediately thereafter.'" Indeed, throughout the in-
me Did he give me ;;orne money (no)" and '·Every body know E ery 
body." And Mincey apparently belic··ed he was being que;;timwd by sev-
eral different policemen, not Hu~t alone ; although it. wa;; Rust who told 
Mincey he had killed a policeman, later in the interrogation Mincey 
indicated he thought it was someonp ebe. 
H• In his reconstruction of the interrogation, see n. 11 , supra, Rust 
stated that, aftE'r hE' a;:;kE'd Mincey some questions to try to identify one 
of the other victims, tlw following en~m·d: 
"RUST: ... What do you rE>member that happened? 
" MINCEY : I remPmbPr ;;omE>body standiPg over me saying 'Move· 
nigger, move.' I was on the floor bc;:;idE> ihP bed. 
"RUST: Do you remembE>r ::;hooting anymw or firing a gun? 
"MINCEY: This is all I can ~ay without a lawyer . 
"RUST: If you want a lawyer now, I cannot taJk to you any longer, 
however, yon don't have to an~wer any que::;ticns you don't want to. Do 
you still want to talk to me? 
" MINCEY: (Shook his head in an affirmative manner.) 
" IIUST: What else can you remember'? 
"MINCEY : I'm gonna have to put my head together. Thc•rc• are so 
many things I don't. remember I like how did they get. into tlw apartment?.' 
"HUST: How did who get into thl' apartm0nt '? 
"MINCEY: Polirc. 
"HUST: Did you sell some nntcotirs to the guy that was shot'?.' 
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terrogation Mincey vainly asked Rust to desist. Moreover, 
he complained several times that he was confused or unable 
to think clearly, or that he could answer more accurately 
thP next day." But despite' Mincey's entreaties to be let 
"MINCEY: Do you mt>, did hr give me some money? 
"RUST: Yrs. 
"MINCEY: No. 
"RUST: Did you give him n l':tmple? 
"MINCEY: Wlmt, do you eall n. ~>ampl<.''? 
'·RUST: A small amount of drug or narco1ics lo test? 
';MINCEY: l can't say v•ithout a lawyer. 
"RUST: Did anyone f'il)' polier or nnrrl' whrn th<'y rnme into the 
apartment? 
"MINCEY: Let tn<.' get mysrlf iog<'t·h<'r fir:-;t. You see, I'm not for 
sure everything happened so fa~l. I can't. lUlt;W<'r at this time because 
r don't think HO, but I can't. ~ay for ;;ure. Somr qurstions aren't clear to 
mo at l he prrsrnt time. 
"RUST: Did you shoot nn~·mw? 
"MINCEY: I can't say.! have to ~>ee a lawyer." (Empha~i;,; Hupplird.) 
Wlule some of Minc<'y'~ an»wN~ ~<·<·m relat ivt'ly I'<'Spon:-;iv<' lo 1 hr qurs-
twn~, it muHt be remrmb!'rrd that Hu:-;t acldrd th<' qu!':;tions at a later 
datr , with the an ·wers in front of him. Ser 11. 11. supra. The reliabilit)· 
of HuHt ':; report io; unc<'rtain. For exam pi<', Ilust rlaimed thai imme-
dmlely after MitH'<'Y first rxpr<'~RPd a. dP~in• to remain :-;iiPnt. Hu~t ;,;aid 
MincPy need not answer an)' qu<~tion.~ but. l\linr<')' re:;ponded b~· inclical-
mg that lw want<'cl io cont illlH'. Tlwre i~ no eont rmponlllPOUH record 
~upportmg Hust 's Htat!'ment that ~finery n.ried ~o inron:;i:<t!'ntl~· immedi-
atrly aJier n<'sPrting hil" wish not to n•spond furill('r, nor did the nur::;p who 
wa.s prrsent. during tlw int!'rrogation rorrohorat<' Hust. Tht' Arizona 
Supreme Court npparrntl~· di:<I.JPlit•vecl Hu:<t in thi:-; rt':iJW<'t. sin<'!' it ~iatrcl 
that "aft<'r each indirHtion from I :\finrey I that he wanted to rOJl~ult an 
attonu•y or that ll(' wantPd to stop unf:'weriug (Jil<'stion~, tlw polirr ofi-irt'r 
rontmued to que;,;twn I him]." 115 Ariz., at 479, 5fi6 l'. 2d, at. 2HO (<'m-
pha;,;Js supplird) . 
' 7 In addition 1o the :;talt'tnl'nts quol<'d inn. 16, supra, :\Tince~· wrotP at 
various times during the interrogation: "TIH•ro ar<.' a. lot of thing:-; that 
aren 't clrar,'' "Thnt'" why I lmve to han• time to rP<Io <'V<'rything in my 
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alone, Hust ceased the interrogation only during intervals 
when Mincey lost cousciousness or received medical treatment, 
and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his 
task. The statements at issue were thus the result of virtually 
continuous questioning of a seriously and painfully wounded 
man on the edge of consciousness. 
There were not present i11 this case some of the gross abuses 
that have led the Court ill other cases to find confessions in-
voluntary, such as beatings, see Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 
278, or "truth serums," see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 299. 
But "the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an 
unconstitutioual inquisition." Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 
U. S., at 206. Determination of whether a statement is 
involuntary "requires more than a mere color-matching of 
cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 P. S. 433, 442. It requires careful 
evaluation of all thf' circumstances of the interrogation.' 8 
It is apparent from the record in this case that Mincey's 
statements were not "the product of lhisj free and rational 
choice." Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 521. To the 
contrary, the undisputed evidence makes clear that Mincey 
wanted not to answer Detective Rust. But Mincey was weak-
ened by pain and shock. isolatf'd from family, friends and legal 
counsel, and barely conscious. and his will was simply over-
borne. Due process of law requires that statements obtained 
as these were cannot be used in any way against a defendant 
at his trial. 
mind ," '' I 'm not for sure," a.nd " I'm not ,;nrEI as of now." He also wrote: 
"If 11 s po:-;sible t.o gpt a lawer [sic I now. We can finish the talk. He 
could direct me in the right direction where as without a law~·pr I might 
saw [sic] somPthing thinking that. it mean~ ::;omething Pbe." And at 
another point. he wrote " Lets ra.p tomarrow [sic]. fa.cc to fac<'. I ra.n't 
give fact s. If something happin~ rsicl I don't know about .. " 
' ~ E . g .. Boulde11 , .. llolman, ~9-J. U. S. 478, 480 : Clewis v. Tnas, :3R5 
:([. S. 707, 708; llaynes v. Washington., 373 U. S. 503, 513-514. 
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IV 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Arizona 
Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for fur~ 
ther proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
~ttpttm:t Qftturlttf ffrt ~b ~htttg 
:.lt&'Jringhm. ~. af. 21lp'!~ 
CHAMBERS 0,. 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J. BRENNAN, .JR. May 18, 1978 
RE: No. 77-5353 Mincey v. Arizona 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Dear Potter: 
,jn.p:rtntt <!fettrl of tqt ~~ ~hdtg 
'JjiJas!p:ng-htn. ~. <!f. 2llbi'!~ 
May 23, 1978 
Re: 76-5353 Mincey v. Arizona 
I renain in ~ey conference position to reverse, but there 
are a few aspects of the opinion .which lead liE to consider adding 
not to exceed a page or two. This will also enable ne to see 
how persuasive Bill's dissent will be. On precedent he is 
swinming upstream. 
Mr. Potter Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
5~- J"v-e <:Jo:wz.J 
~nprttttt <!Jourl of ~tb ~twtt 
'Jliasfrittgtott. 19. <!f. 2ll~J!~ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
June 7, 1978 
Re: No. 77-5353 - Mincey v. Arizona 
Dear Potter: 
I anticipate having a dissent around within a day or 
so in this case, and I think there is some prospect that if 
my dissent does not persuade you to change your mind, the 
case could come down on some day other than Monday next week. 
Sincerely,~ 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
..JUSTICE POTTER STEWA RT 
.:§u:pr mtt C!J!!ttrl of tlrt 'Jt{ttittb- ,jntU 
'JID'agqin.ghm. gl . C!J. 2.0.;i'~.;l 
June 9, 1978 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re : No. 77-5353, Mincey v. Arizona 
I propose to add a new footnote 14 at the end of the 
paragraph on page 11 of this opinion, as follows : 
14/ 
- Contrary to imp!ications in the dissenting 
opinion, post, at 6, the record contains no in-
dication, and the State does not . claim, that the 
question of voluntariness was submitted to the 
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